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2. Not Knowing as Knowledge: asymmetry between archaeology and 
anthropology 
Thomas Yarrow 
 
Asymmetry 
This paper explores the widespread understanding that archaeology and anthropology 
exist in an asymmetrical relationship to one another characterized by an 
archaeological theoretical ‘trade deficit’. While the paper questions the basis on which 
this asymmetry has been imagined, it explores the effects that this has had. Through 
examining how archaeologists and anthropologists have historically imagined the 
relationship between these disciplines, the article sets out to understand the 
implications of this asymmetry for both. Rather than seek to redress this asymmetry, it 
demonstrates how asymmetry has in fact been archaeologically productive, leading to 
an explicitness about archaeological procedures and their limits and concomitantly to 
an openness to other disciplinary insights.  On the other hand, for anthropologists the 
perception of asymmetry simultaneously arises from and leads to assumptions that 
have foreclosed certain lines of enquiry, relating to a disciplinary narrowing of 
horizons.  
 
In the introduction to An Ethnography of the Neolithic, Chris Tilley starts by 
describing an archaeological fantasy that is revealing of wider assumptions both about 
the kinds of knowledge that archaeologists and anthropologists produce and about the 
relationships between these disciplines: 
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I have sometimes imagined what it might be like to be transported back into 
the past in a time capsule, to arrive somewhere in Sweden during the Neolithic 
and to be able to observe what was really going on, stay for a couple of years 
and then return to the late twentieth century and write up my ethnography. I 
have thought how much richer, fuller and more sophisticated the account 
would be. I would actually know who made and used the pots and axes, what 
kind of kinship system existed, how objects were exchanged and by whom, the 
form and nature of ethnic boundaries, the details of initiation rites, the 
meaning of pot designs and the significance of mortuary ceremonies.  
(Tilley, 1996: 1)  
 
Tellingly, whilst such archaeological fantasies of time-travel are common, the 
corresponding fantasy does not seem to capture the anthropological imagination: 
anthropologists, to my knowledge, do not often fantasize about the possibility of 
travelling forwards in time and viewing their own field-sites through the material 
remains of the people who once lived there. Why might this be? My suggestion is that 
the asymmetry is indicative of a wider perception, shared by archaeologists and 
anthropologists alike, that the ‘partial’ and ‘fragmented’ nature of archaeological 
evidence leaves archaeologists with less to say about the issues of social life taken to 
be at the heart of both disciplines (see also Lucas and Filippucci, this volume).  
 
Tilley himself deconstructs aspects of this common archaeological fantasy of time 
travel, arguing that archaeological and anthropological accounts are both constructed 
from different elements that need to be interpreted and made sense of in similar ways 
(cf. Lucas, 2005). However, as he rightly points out, such fantasies are indicative of a 
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wider perception of disciplinary asymmetry, that underscores the theoretical ‘trade’ 
between archaeologists and anthropologists: archaeologists commonly imagine 
themselves to lack the kinds of theories and insights that anthropologists can provide, 
and routinely draw on these in their descriptions and analyses of the past. Despite 
some notable exceptions (e.g. Ingold, 1992, Layton, 2008) anthropologists rarely 
seem to incorporate the ideas, theories or descriptions of archaeologists in their own 
accounts.   
 
In pointing to the mutual entanglements of archaeology and anthropology, the 
archaeologist Chris Gosden (1999) argues that it would be impossible to imagine the 
discipline of archaeology in the absence of anthropological writing on subjects such 
as gift exchange, kinship, symbolism, and gender. By the same token he also suggests 
that archaeological writing has contributed to the discipline of anthropology in terms 
of an understanding of long-term chronology. Yet even if we accept that this is the 
case, an almost total lack of any explicit anthropological acknowledgement of this 
‘debt’ remains puzzling.  
 
Despite a long history of archaeological claims for the potential theoretical and 
substantive contribution of the discipline, a disciplinary ‘trade deficit’ (Gosden, 1999, 
Tilley, 1996, 2006) therefore seems to persist. As Tilley has noted, a concern with the 
‘mutual relationship’ has taken place almost exclusively within archaeological 
discussions, suggesting that ‘while most archaeologists read some anthropology, few 
anthropologists seem to read any archaeology' (1996: 2). Some time ago Rowlands 
and Gledhill similarly described this imbalance of interest, suggesting that Gordon 
Childe was ‘the only archaeologist that many anthropologists in this country ever 
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admit to having read’ (1977: 144). Tellingly, archaeologically authored introductions 
to anthropology such as Bryony Orme’s (1981) Anthropology for Archaeologists, Ian 
Hodder’s (1982a) The Present Past and more recently Gosden’s Archaeology and 
Anthropology (1999), do not have their counterparts within anthropology.  
 
Interestingly the recent theoretical convergences that have taken place around areas 
such as material culture, gender and the body do not seem to have fundamentally 
altered this relationship. While Hodder points to the origin of many of the theoretical 
frameworks that have informed these developments in disciplines such as philosophy 
and sociology, he notes that within archaeology '...there was still a "looking over ones 
shoulder" at cultural anthropology to see how translations and applications of the 
ideas had been made in a related discipline.' (2005: 132) 
 
The fact that anthropological accounts of the disciplinary relationship are rare is itself 
symptomatic of a perceived asymmetry  on the part of anthropologists. Until recently, 
Tim Ingold has been a notable exception in his insistence that ‘anthropology needs 
archaeology if it is to substantiate its claims to be a genuinely historical science’ 
(1992: 64). In the wake of the 2009 Association of Social Anthropology conference 
on ‘Archaeological and Anthropological Imaginations: past, present and future’, this 
may be set to change. Calls during this conference, by archaeologists and 
anthropologists, for an increasing anthropological sensitivity to archaeological 
thinking are clearly to be welcomed. Nonetheless, it is important to be sensitive to the 
terrain in which such exchanges take place and the asymmetries – actual or perceived 
– that have attended these.  
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Taking up one of the central themes of the volume, this paper explores the question of 
why this perception of asymmetry persists and asks what this might reveal about the 
disciplinary theories and practices of archaeology and anthropology? In pursuing this 
line of enquiry my intention is not to ‘overcome’ this asymmetry. Rather I want to 
examine its theoretical and practical consequences. This entails considering the 
possibility that an archaeological perception of absence – whether of data or theory – 
is itself constitutive of a distinctive disciplinary ontology and that as such it need not 
be considered in negative terms. Thus my aim is not simply to put ‘the other side’, by 
showing how archaeological concepts or findings may be of use to anthropologists. 
Instead my analysis highlights how archaeologists and anthropologists have imagined 
how ‘sides’ are drawn up in the first place. Rather than pre-suppose a distinction 
between ‘archaeology’ and ‘anthropology’ as the self-evident starting point of 
analysis, I suggest that this distinction is itself an artefact of various debates within 
and between these disciplines. As such it has taken a variety of different forms.  
 
My own interest is not, to highlight where archaeologists might fruitfully contribute 
theoretical or substantive insight (as other contributors to this volume do 
convincingly). Rather I want to argue that successive theoretical developments have 
been driven by a perception of disciplinary asymmetry with regards to 
anthropological knowledge practices. To borrow again from the imagery of 
theoretical ‘trade’, my intention is not to engage in this trade but to try to understand 
the underlying ideas and assumptions that have driven it.   
 
In this way, I hope to contribute to a ‘symmetrical’ (Latour, 1993, Latour, 1987) 
understanding of the issue of asymmetry. Rather than take asymmetry as the taken for 
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granted starting point of analysis I suggest that it needs to be accounted for in terms of 
an analysis of the practices, relationships and ideas that produce it. This entails an 
attempt to understand the ways in which a disciplinary sense of deficiency is itself 
constitutive of particular forms of interpretation and analysis and how a perception of 
absence has proved a stimulus to very different kinds of theorising. 
 
Connections and Disconnections 
Through an exploration of the shifting ways in which the relationship between 
archaeology and anthropology has been understood, I seek to highlight the different 
theoretical positions that have variously been used to explain and redress a sense of 
theoretical ‘deficit’. In doing so, I do not propose to provide a comprehensive 
historical overview of disciplinary trends (see Hodder, 1982a, Gosden, 1999, Orme, 
1981, Trigger, 1989) but rather seek to shed light on the terms within which the 
relationship between archaeology and anthropology has been explicitly conceived 
within archaeological and anthropological debates.  
 
As a number of authors have argued (Gosden, 1999, Orme, 1981, Ingold, 1992, 
Wylie, 1985), the social evolutionism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century provided a theoretical context in which the study of past and present societies 
were seen to be inextricably linked.  In attempting to account for contemporary 
cultural and biological diversity archaeological and anthropological material was 
treated equally, in the sense that both shed light on the common processes of 
evolution by which that difference came about. In other words a single theoretical 
framework both necessitated and enabled the collection of different kinds of data. 
Because archaeology and anthropology were not at this point institutionalised as 
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distinct disciplinary endeavours, the issue of their ‘relationship’ did not explicitly 
arise.  
 
The formal distinction between archaeology and anthropology can be seen to arise 
from a set of methodological and institutional changes that took place during the 
beginning of the twentieth century: the creation of distinct departments and the 
formalization, differentiation and specialization of different fieldwork techniques 
acted as processes of ‘mediation’ and ‘purification’ (Latour 1993) through which the 
disciplinary distinction between archaeology and anthropology became increasingly 
solidified (Lucas, in press).  
 
As others have suggested, these distinctions were institutionalized and theoretically 
elaborated in different ways within North American and British traditions. In North 
America there has tended to be a closer relationship between archaeology and 
anthropology, a fact that Hodder (1982a: 38) attributes in part to the ways in which 
the presence of native American societies created awareness of the potential for using 
ethnographic analogies to explain archaeological phenomena. In this way the ‘direct 
historic’ approach developed in the 1930s and 1940s, based on the assumption that the 
accounts of ethnographers and ethno-historians could be fruitfully employed as a way 
of understanding archaeological remains within the same area (see also Robinson this 
volume). From this perspective Taylor claimed that the archaeologist was 'Jekyll and 
Hyde, claiming to 'do' history but 'be' an anthropologist' (1948: 6). Archaeology was 
squarely defined in anthropological terms, as part of the four-fold approach that 
persists today (Segal and Yanagisako, 2005). 
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In the UK, by contrast, the functionalism of anthropologists such as Radcliffe-Brown 
and Malinowski led to the increasing institutionalization of disciplinary difference in 
ways that mitigated against collaboration. In the wake of Radcliffe-Brown’s rejection 
of ‘conjectural history’, Gordon Childe (1946) sought to reinstate a sense of 
archaeology’s distinctive contribution to the study of humanity, arguing that an 
understanding of the contemporary functions of particular social institutions has to be 
complemented by an understanding of their historical evolution in order to move 
beyond a descriptive technique to the classificatory science that he proposed should 
be the common aim of both. In this way the essential parity between archaeology and 
anthropology was seen to derive from methodological differences that acted to define 
a particular kind of collaborative relationship. Anthropological participant observation 
led to an integrative model of society that archaeologists could not hope to replicate 
on the basis of the archaeological record. Nonetheless, archaeological evidence was 
seen to enable an historical analysis of the development of social institutions that 
would provide, ‘a valid clue to the rank of a contemporary culture and its position in 
an evolutionary sequence’. (Childe 1946: 250). Archaeology and anthropology were 
seen as ‘complementary departments of the science of man related in the same way, 
as palaeontology and zoology in the science of life’ (1946: 243).  
 
In a similar vein the British archaeologist Christopher Hawkes (1954) proposed a 
form of collaboration that depended on the pursuit of common aims and objectives 
through complementary and distinctive forms of theory and methodology. Hawkes’ 
famous ‘ladder of inference’ points to the paradox that whilst archaeology is defined 
in terms of the study of people in the past, the ideas, beliefs and social and political 
arrangements of these people have to be inferred in their absence. While he suggests 
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that it is relatively easy to infer the techniques by which archaeological artefacts are 
produced and even the subsistence economies that would have prevailed, he is more 
pessimistic about the possibility of inferring information about social and political 
organisation on the basis of the kind of information that prehistorians have access to. 
Thus he asks rhetorically:  
If you excavate a settlement in which one hut is bigger than all others, is it a 
chief’s hut so you can infer chiefship, or is it really a medicine lodge or a 
meeting hut for initiatives, or a temple? […] How much could the 
archaeologist of the future infer, from his archaeology alone, of the 
Melanesian institutions studied by Malinowski? (1954: 161-162).  
 
Hawkes’ recognition of the limits of archaeological evidence led him to suggest that 
anthropologists could provide information on non-material aspects of culture that the 
archaeological record does not preserve. Anthropology, in other words, provided the 
means by which ‘gaps’ in the archaeological record could be ‘filled in’. In this view 
anthropology not only provided information of use in the reconstruction of past 
societies, but also, by implication, a model of society and in this sense ‘the making 
more fully anthropological’ of the past was taken as the goal of archaeology.  
 
In different ways, the accounts of both Childe and Hawkes thus locate an underlying 
asymmetry between archaeology and anthropology in the unequal access that these 
disciplines respectively have to ‘society’. In the light of subsequent critiques, it could 
rightly be objected that this apparent asymmetry rests on a misunderstanding in so far 
as both these theories reify and objectify society as a knowable, tangible and holistic 
entity. Not only does this negate the theoretical and ethnographic work of 
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anthropologists in making this entity appear, it also effectively places 
ethnographically informed knowledge beyond critical scrutiny as a form of 
‘information’ or ‘data’.  
 
Whether or not we agree with the theoretical positions adopted by these 
archaeologists, however, is not really the point. Rather I want to direct attention 
beyond their own explicit understandings in order to suggest that this perception of 
asymmetry in fact had productive effects. In particular, the understanding that 
archaeological data was in certain respects deficient stimulated archaeologists to look 
beyond the discipline in search of new ideas and theories. In doing so, the 
understanding was that knowledge could be ‘applied’ from anthropologically ‘known’ 
contexts, to archaeological contexts that were less well known. Yet this language of 
‘application’ conceals the extent to which archaeological borrowings of 
anthropological ideas change and extend them. Regardless of the view one takes of 
Hawkes’ ‘ladder of inference’, it makes explicit limits to archaeological data and the 
interpretations these give rise to. By contrast, during the same period, anthropological 
faith in functionalist models and methods tended to preclude understanding of the 
limits to interpretation and analysis. Consequently both Hawkes and Childe’s 
assessment that these limits lay in the absence of historical consideration, went largely 
unheeded. A holistic vision of society had its counterpart in a holistic vision of the 
discipline of anthropology, in ways that precluded the historical dimension that 
archaeological accounts could have helped provide.  
 
With the advent of ‘processual’ or ‘new’ archaeology during the 1960s, a rather 
different conception of the relationship between archaeology and anthropology 
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developed. By contrast to the ‘culture-history’ approach of archaeologists such as 
Childe, processual archaeologists responded to a perceived disciplinary asymmetry by 
arguing that rather than simply contribute to the explanation of difference within 
particular locales, archaeologists should seek to generate general laws to explain 
broader processes of cultural evolution. For Lewis Binford, the North American 
archaeologist at the forefront of this approach, processualism was explicitly seen to 
provide a framework within which archaeology could make a more significant 
contribution to anthropology. In outlining his vision of ‘Archaeology as 
Anthropology’, Binford aimed, ‘to escalate the role which the archaeological 
discipline is playing in furthering the aims of anthropology and to offer suggestions as 
to how we, as archaeologists, may profitably shoulder more responsibility for 
furthering the aims of our field.’ (1962: 217). In this view, anthropology was defined 
as the attempt to explain the total range of physical and cultural similarities and 
differences within the entire temporal span of human existence. Since most of the 
evidence for this difference was understood to be available only through an 
examination of archaeological material, this was seen to give archaeology an 
advantage in one key respect:  
We as archaeologists have available a wide range of variability and a large 
sample of cultural systems. Ethnographers are restricted to the small and 
formally limited extant cultural systems. (1962: 224).  
While Binford argued that archaeologists could not dig up social systems or ideology, 
he saw these limitations to be offset by the extensiveness of the archaeological record 
and its ability to enable examination of long-term processes of cultural change in 
ways that the ethnographic record does not allow. Moreover he was far less 
circumspect about the possibility of inferring reliable information about the 
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functioning of extinct cultural systems on the basis of archaeological remains than 
many of his archaeological and anthropological contemporaries, suggesting that:   
Granted we cannot excavate kinship terminology or a philosophy but we can 
and do excavate the material items which functioned together with these more 
behavioural elements within the appropriate cultural sub-systems. The formal 
structure of artefact assemblages together with the between element contextual 
relationships should and do present a systematic and understandable picture of 
the total extinct cultural system. (1962: 218-9) 
 
Within America this processual or ‘new’ archaeology paved the way for increasing 
collaboration between archaeologists and anthropologists. In particular evolutionary 
anthropologists such as Lee and Devore (1968) saw the potential for synergy in terms 
of their aims of understanding processes of cultural development through the 
generation of generalized laws. Thus in the introduction to Man the Hunter Lee and 
Devore’s (1968) proposition that the emergence of economic, social and ideological 
forms is as much a part of human evolution as developments in human anatomy and 
physiology, provides the context in which archaeological and anthropological 
approaches are seen to provide different forms of data on the same basic problems.  
 
Within the UK, by contrast, the advent of the ‘new’ archaeology was accompanied by 
a conception of the relationship between archaeology and anthropology in rather 
different terms (cf. Gosden, 1999, Hodder, 1982a). While David Clarke’s ‘analytic 
archaeology’ shared many of the aims and objectives of Binford’s processualism, his 
assertion that ‘archaeology is archaeology is archaeology’ (1968: 13), contrasted with 
Binford’s view of ‘anthropological archaeology’. Renfrew’s ‘social archaeology’ 
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(1984) was heavily influenced by American processualists such as Binford but also 
differed in highlighting the distinctiveness of an archaeological approach in terms of 
an emphasis on material culture. While Renfrew’s (1973) edited volume The 
Explanation of Culture Change sought to bring archaeological and anthropological 
perspectives to bear on a set of common issues, the concluding remarks written by the 
structuralist anthropologist Edmund Leach serve to highlight how far apart – from an 
anthropological perspective, at least – these disciplines were imagined to be.  
 
For Leach the search by processual archaeologists for general laws of cultural and 
social behaviour directly contradicted anthropological evidence for the infinite 
variability of social and cultural life, a view reflected in his candid assessment of the 
conference from which papers from the volume were drawn:  
 
'All along contributors were making remarks that could only make sense if 
you were to take as given a unilinear theory of social development of a kind 
which the social anthropologists finally abandoned about forty years ago. As 
far as social anthropology is concerned, I appreciate your difficulty as 
archaeologists; you would like to use the data of ethnography to give fresh 
blood to your archaeological remnants. Used with great discretion I believe 
that ethnographic evidence can in fact help you to do this; but far too many of 
the participants at the seminar seemed to think that the analogies between 
ethnographic society and archaeological society are direct ... i.e. that 
'primitive' societies from the 20th century can be treated as fossilized survivals 
from proto-historical or even paleolithic times.' (Leach, 1973: 761) 
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In this vein he denigrated the functionalism of such ‘new’ archaeology and the 
concomitant emphasis on economic subsistence, settlement patterns and demography, 
arguing these overlooked the more fundamental issue of what was ‘in the minds of the 
actors’ (1973: 769), namely, religion and politics.  
 
Leach’s critiques of the processual archaeology of the time were in many ways 
pertinent and despite his own assessment of the barriers to meaningful dialogue, his 
intervention was important in helping to push archaeological theory in new directions. 
Foreshadowing later post-processual archaeological critiques, he highlighted the 
problems of treating the ethnographic record as ‘information’ and of reducing 
‘primitive’ contemporary societies to the status of fossilized survivals of an 
archaeological past. However in overstating the theoretical and methodological scope 
of anthropology (a point to which I return below), I suggest that Leach mistook the 
perception of deficit that archaeologists themselves articulated, with a literal absence 
of insight or understanding. Taking archaeological assessments of the ‘partiality’ of 
their data at face value, he overlooked the space that this perception creates for 
archaeological theorisation and imagination.  
 
Whether or not we find the theories of processual archaeologists convincing is not 
really the point. What I want to highlight is rather the way in which an archaeological 
perception that kinship and philosophy are ‘missing’, opens up a space for ideas and 
data beyond the discipline. The middle range theory of processual archaeologists 
departs from earlier archaeological formulations such as those proposed by Childe 
and Hawkes in imagining ethnography not as a source of ‘direct’ analogies but as the 
basis upon which cultural universals could be derived. Nonetheless both constitute 
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theoretical and analytical frameworks that effectively account for what archaeology is 
imagined to lack. Although the theoretical context had changed considerably, a 
holistic and systemic vision of society opened up archaeological interest in 
anthropology, whilst closing down anthropological interest in archaeology. 
Understanding society as a holistic entity, albeit one that was symbolically rather than 
functionally integrated, led to the anthropological perception of disciplinary self-
sufficiency, leaving little space for archaeological ideas.  
 
Against this backdrop, contributors to a conference that later appeared as a volume 
edited by Spriggs (1977a) sought to build a theoretical ‘bridge’. Although different 
contributors had a range of perspectives on the form that this might take, the 
reconciliation of structuralism and Marxism was seen by many to provide a 
theoretical framework within which archaeological and anthropological perspectives 
could be reconciled. Spriggs, for example, advocated a form of structural Marxism 
suggesting that by contrast to the ahistorical structuralism of anthropologists such as 
Leach and Levi-Strauss this would, ‘create a more comprehensive theory, allowing 
the explanation of socio-cultural change in ways that 'could provide a useful 
framework for archaeologists, anthropologists and historians' (1977b: 5). In a similar 
vein Rowlands and Gledhill (1977) argued that in anthropology history was treated at 
best as ‘background’ and analysis of more dynamic social processes remained limited, 
and hence:  
At the present time ... the responsibility lies with archaeologists to develop 
theoretically the structural models that will be required to achieve recently 
stated aims concerning the explanation of long-term processes of change. 
(1977: 155) 
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Marrying structuralist concerns with socially and culturally embedded systems of 
symbolisation and meaning with a Marxist concern with historical transformation, 
was thus seen by a number of British archaeologists of the late 1970s to create the 
theoretical context in which both archaeology and anthropology could contribute to 
the elucidation of long-term cultural change on the basis of equals. As with earlier 
paradigms, the development of a new theoretical framework came largely from within 
archaeology and was concerned to redress an existing relationship of theoretical 
inequality. 
 
While Hodder’s ‘post-processual’ or ‘contextual’ archaeology (1982a, 1982b) arose in 
a similar theoretical context, it took a rather different form. In critiquing the 
processual concern to develop universal laws of cultural change, Hodder drew 
extensively from anthropological theory and description. Yet anthropology was not 
seen (as it was for Binford) as a source of information from which to formulate 
empirically testable hypotheses relating to processes of cultural evolution. Rather 
ethnography was taken to constitute a heuristic resource, enabling archaeologists to 
step outside the western frameworks within which archaeological interpretation 
otherwise proceeds. In proposing that all interpretations of the past necessarily draw 
on theoretical and common sense assumptions of people in the present, Hodder 
implicitly recognised a disciplinary asymmetry: the present was knowable in ways 
that the past was not.  
This provided the rationale for drawing on ethnographic analogies and undertaking 
ethno-archaeology ‘in order to clothe the skeleton remains of the past in the flesh and 
blood of living, functioning, acting people’ (1982b: 12. As such, Hodder continued to 
define archaeology partly in terms of anthropologically derived models of society, by 
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which archaeological data was seen to offer less than the complete picture. This 
perception of the missing subject stimulated a renewed interest in the conditions under 
which analogies could legitimately be asserted between past and present societies. In 
contrast to earlier theorists, Hodder also highlighted the possibilities of such absences 
and gaps in their own right. In particular he argued that lacking direct access to 
people, archaeologists are forced to concern themselves with the non-discursive 
aspects of culture, leading to a unique perspective on social and cultural processes: 
'material things can say things which words cannot or do not' (1982b: 207), Hodder 
suggested, arguing in a related way that, 'As archaeologists we are not digging up 
what people said and thought but we are digging up a particular type of expression, 
which, through its ambiguity and subtlety, is powerful and effective’ (1982b: 207).  
 
Archaeological understandings of the relationship between archaeology and 
anthropology have therefore taken a variety of forms, reflecting different perspectives 
on what the aims and theoretical objectives of these disciplines should be. This 
account provides an admittedly partial view that is intended to illustrate some of the 
assumptions that have informed the ways in which archaeologists and anthropologists 
have imagined their relationships to one another. While different theorists have 
located this difference in a range of ways, my suggestion is that archaeology has 
tended to be defined (by archaeologists as well as anthropologists) in terms that make 
it appear to lack the kinds of insights, knowledge or data that anthropology can 
provide. I am not proposing that there is any inherent reason why this has to be the 
case, nor am I suggesting that it could not be otherwise. Nonetheless the account 
highlights how the perception of archaeological deficit has acted as a stimulus to 
make explicit the distinctive nature of archaeological theories and practices.  
18 
 
 
Asymmetry re-considered 
In his ‘concluding remarks’ discussed above, Edmund Leach (1973) explicates what 
he sees as some of the key disciplinary differences between archaeology and 
anthropology, in terms of a set of asymmetries. In particular he suggests that whilst 
anthropologists can observe the workings of social systems ‘first hand’, 
archaeologists are only capable of observing these on the basis of ‘patterned residues’ 
and hence their meaning must ‘forever remain a mystery’ (1973: 767). Archaeology, 
he suggests, is properly about the study of people, yet the nature of the archaeological 
record is such that most aspects of human behaviour remain absent: things may reflect 
the meanings that people give them but are not the meanings themselves; moreover 
since archaeological evidence is necessarily ‘partial’ many of these are lost.  Thus 
archaeology’s absence of people is seen as the basis of a theoretical asymmetry 
between the two: whilst anthropologists can study people directly, archaeologists can 
only study them on the basis of the things they left behind.  
 
In the light of subsequent theoretical discussions, this view can be called into question 
on a number of different levels. In particular archaeologists, anthropologists and 
social studies of science have questioned both the absolute ontological separation of 
people and things (e.g. Latour, 1999, Ingold, 2000, Strathern, 1988, Strathern, 1990, 
Law, 1994, Henare et al., 2007), and the idea that the material world simply reflects 
passively the meanings and ideas of society (e.g. Gell, 1997, Miller, 1998, Miller, 
1987). If the thoughts and ideas of people do not end at their corporeal limits 
(Bateson, 1972, Ingold, 2000) then Leach’s characterisation of the distinction between 
archaeology and anthropology as that between the study of people and the study of 
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things, seems problematic. And if the material world actively participates in the 
construction of meaning and the distribution of agency (e.g. Latour, 1993, Holtorf, 
2002, Knappett, 2002) then a methodology that focuses on material culture seems at 
least in theory to have as much to say about that meaning as one that focuses on the 
spoken words and actions of ‘people’ (Hicks, In press). Recent calls for a 
‘symmetrical’ archaeology (Shanks, 2007, Webmore, 2007, Witmore, 2007) make 
precisely this point.  
 
Moreover, whilst Leach characterises the archaeological record as ‘partial’, 
subsequent theoretical discussions call into question his assumption that 
anthropologists themselves have access to the kinds of social ‘wholes’ that his 
account seems to presuppose. If, as a number of anthropologists have argued (e.g. 
Tyler, 1986, Gupta and Ferguson, 1997, Marcus, 1998, Thornton, 1988) the social 
‘whole’ is an artefact of ethnographic description, as opposed to an actually existing 
empirical reality, then it would seem that Leach is guilty of conflating anthropological 
models, descriptions and theories with ‘the people’ these purport to explain. The 
archaeologist Groube (1977) makes a similar point about the abstraction necessarily 
entailed in ethnographic description, suggesting, after Durkheim, that ‘the immobile 
man he studies is not man’. Seen in this light, anthropologists do not straightforwardly 
study ‘people’: they study the societies and cultures they belong to. As a comment on 
the process of synthesis and abstraction entailed in arriving at these analytic entities, 
Roy Wagner suggested some time ago that in their representations of ‘culture’, 
anthropologists, 'keep the ideas, the quotations, the memoirs, the creations, and let the 
people go' (1975: 26). 
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Seen from this perspective it could be argued that anthropologists do not have a 
privileged position when it comes to studying people; they simply face a different set 
of interpretive issues. Whilst archaeologists may lament an absence of ‘people’, the 
presence of living, talking humans simply brings to light a different set of 
methodological and interpretive problems. Indeed the (broadly post-structuralist) 
writing of a number of anthropologists (e.g. Fortun, 2001, Gupta and Ferguson, 1997, 
Rabinow, 1986, Clifford, 1986) has increasingly made some of these evident, through 
calling into question the means by which anthropologists elicit and represent the 
meanings and beliefs of those they study. In place of the image of the social ‘whole’, 
anthropologists have pointed to the partial and selective view that ethnographic 
fieldwork necessarily entails, to the ways in which the subjectivity of the fieldworker 
conditions the nature of his/her findings, and to the necessarily selective process by 
which disparate utterances, situations and acts are pieced together through writing and 
analysis. From this perspective it would seem that rather than a relationship of 
asymmetry there in fact exists one of difference. Yet to argue in this way that 
disciplinary imbalance is illusory, is to fail to account for the importance of this sense 
of imbalance and the theoretical and practical consequences this has had (and 
arguably continues to have) for archaeologists and anthropologists respectively.  
 
If archaeologists confront a different set of interpretive and methodological problems 
then they have also developed a distinct set of theoretical ‘solutions’. Over the years, 
archaeologists have made these explicit in a variety of different ways, suggesting for 
example, that an archaeological perspective leads to a unique understanding of 
processes of social evolution (e.g. Binford, 1962), long-term change (e.g. Rowlands 
and Gledhill, 1977), and material culture (e.g. Hodder, 1982b).  In these various ways, 
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archaeology has brought unique insights on the wider issue of what it means to be 
human.  
 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that these ideas are inherently less interesting, 
significant or valid than the kinds of theories produced by anthropologists. Rather my 
suggestion is that many of these developments have been driven precisely by the 
sense that archaeology lacks certain kinds of knowledge. This sense of deficiency or 
lack has taken a variety of different forms. Clearly not all of these are equally useful 
and I am not straightforwardly advocating any one of them. My point is that much 
archaeological thinking constitutes a particular knowledge of absence, that is not the 
same as an absence of knowledge.  
 
In making this point I wish to draw an analogy between archaeologists and the 
Baktamin of Papua New Guinea, for whom Strathern (re-interpreting the work of 
Frederik Barth) has suggested: ‘the knowledge that they are lost is not, so to speak, 
lost knowledge, it is knowledge about absence, about forgetting and about an 
unrecoverable background’ (1991: 97-8). Confronted by a sense of loss, Baktamin 
initiators, she suggests, are forced into making the knowledge that they retain work, 
not by filling in the gaps, but by borrowing from the knowledge of their neighbours 
and by making that which remains do the differentiating work it has to. In this way 
they are forced to make what is to hand carry the marks of a lost complexity: 
‘Perhaps seeing their own activities like so many particles of dust against a 
huge background of ignorance is what spurs their efforts. This ignorance is not 
of the unknowable: it is of what has been dropped from their repertoire, the 
intervening particles that once completed what is now left’ (1991: 98).  
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With this image of knowledge in mind, we might seek to reappraise the idea that the 
‘partiality’ of archaeological data is the problem that many have imagined it to be. 
Although archaeological thinking has often been premised on an illusory conception 
of the ‘completeness’ of anthropologically informed models of society, the attendant 
sense of archaeological ‘partiality’ has been productive.  As the preceding account 
demonstrates, it has acted as a wellspring for theoretical innovation, prompting 
archaeologists to re-imagine their own discipline in new terms and to critically 
appraise archaeological practices and assumptions; it has led to forms of analysis and 
theorising that are explicit in the acknowledgement of their own limits; and it has led 
to a focus on aspects of social life that are often overlooked.   
 
As such, the perception of theoretical deficit has led to a kind of disciplinary 
reflexivity that anthropology has tended to lack. While many anthropologists would 
argue that the very strength of the discipline lies in its capacity to use other people’s 
views of the world as a way of unpicking its own epistemological foundations, such 
openness has been largely absent in anthropological engagements with archaeology. 
Going against the grain of prevailing thought in both disciplines, my suggestion is that 
the perception of disciplinary asymmetry has actually been far more of a problem for 
anthropology than it has for archaeology.  
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